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On April 12, the AFL-CIO is expected to send over 10,000 workers into the streets of
Washington, chanting slogans against China’s entry into the WTO. They will be joined, no
doubt, by  other veterans of  the “battle of Seattle” last year, many ranting against the WTO but
also flexing their muscle for a larger show of street strength against the IMF and the World Bank
this week. Such agit-prop tactics, having so far met only with a complaisant response by the
US administration  (as epitomized by the unpreparedness at Seattle and the mollycoddling with
weasel  words of approbation of their “good intentions” instead of a spirited engagement of their
false assertions and an imaginative redirection and reformulation of their  ill-considered
demands),  have  made these groups infer  mistakenly that they are an increasingly unstoppable
force.
Following on the failure of  Clinton’s fast-track request and the Seattle debacle, the loss
of the China vote coming in the midst of yet more street theatre will therefore have momentous
political consequences beyond the issue itself: indeed, from the viewpoint of future negotiated
trade liberalization, this is really “make or break” time. Hence, finally, the somnolent pro-trade
and pro-WTO groups, including businesses and economists,  must wake up: this is the battle that
will define the outcome of the war against trade that these self-style “progressive” but in reality
reactionary groups are waging against trade, a powerful engine of worldwide economic
prosperity and social improvement.
As it happens,  this should be no contest. The economic case against China’s entry into
the WTO is weak to the point of being laughable. But, the case for our not going along with the
entry if other nations admit China into the WTO, as they can (since only a 2/3rds majority vote is
necessary for entry of a new member) and will, is weaker still. And the human-rights case for
barring China’s entry is not compelling under either scenario.
Case for China’s Entry
At the outset, China is a major player in trade and belongs in an organization that is part
of the postwar superstructure of international institutions whose implicit objective is universal
membership. China’s continuing exclusion on its human-rights record or the incompleteness of
its reforms and markets, is illogical and inequitable.  Countries (such as Iraq and Syria) with
comparable human-rights lapses belong to the WTO; and China’s splendid economic
performance reflects a steady shift to functioning markets.
China’s exclusion also means that, while we continue to trade with it, we will also lose
the substantial gains which Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky has managed to negotiate by way
of  several new concessions by China as “sweeteners” for our favorable vote on the WTO entry.
It is ironic that , as with NAFTA where we got far more than we gave to Mexico, China is giving
much and getting little directly by way of  our own trade concessions: and yet the China vote is
often opposed as their gain and our loss.
But, equally important, we must remember that our trade gains without WTO
membership for China will remain circumscribed by the lack of the disciplines and the rule of
law that WTO membership imposes. Bilateral treaties (including our November 1999 agreement
with China)  are invariably narrower in scope. Besides, as our experience with China on
intellectual property protection underlines, it is pretty hard to enforce effectively a bilateral
agreement without creating nationalist resentments and evasions. By contrast, the WTO imposes
wide-ranging disciplines which are accompanied by a Dispute Settlement mechanism that greatly
enhances enforceability because of its multilateral nature (that prevents bilateral eyeball-to-
eyeball confrontations as in the horrendous US-Japan auto dispute where we lost anyway), its
impartiality, and its built-in retribution for non-compliance.
The skeptics fear that, instead of being disciplined by the WTO, China will wreck the
WTO and its disciplines. This is a gratuitous nightmare. Large as it is, China is nowhere near
large enough to have any clout  by itself; nor should we assume that many countries, even the
poor ones,  will ally themselves with China to undermine the working of the WTO. Nor can we
assume that China will have an incentive to play havoc with an institution whose membership it
seeks and whose rules it must buy into for membership. Far more likely, the WTO will be the
bull in China’s shop, aiding the proponents of globalization and the rule of law that fight the
ideologues from the past.
But we must not forget that the benefits to us will flow also from the fact that we
ourselves will be subject to the WTO disciplines in our trade with China! Thus, we cannot freely
resort to anti-dumping actions, to voluntary export restraints, if China is a WTO member: we are
therefore protected against our own protectionists by China’s WTO entry. Just remember how
we surrendered to steel protectionism by forcing Russia (a WTO non-member) into export
restraint only last year.
Going Alone Against China’s Entry
But the huge folly of keeping China out of the WTO is minuscule compared to our
opposing her entry when others are ready to vote her in. The AFL-CIO, among others, thinks that
we can do this without any cost to ourselves in terms of discriminatory treatment of us by China
relative to the other WTO members: but this is surely wrong and would be a dreadfully
expensive outcome.
The scenario where we oppose China’s entry, invoking for this purpose Article 35 of
GATT and Article 13 of the WTO “Charter” when China is admitted by others’ votes, implies
that we are not constrained to offer China any of the WTO-membership rights and thus can
continue the denial of Permanent MFN status: as, in fact, several European nations did to Japan
when it first became a GATT member under our generous postwar leadership. But it carries the
downside that it simultaneously implies that China can in turn deny  us our  WTO rights, thus
imperiling for sure our own MFN status in China, for instance, and thus putting our market
access to China under a serious threat of discrimination vis-à-vis our European, Japanese and
other competitors. The AFL-CIO’s advisers believe that the 1999 agreement can still gain us
non-discrimination, but that is surely foolish advice.
Human Rights: “Open-Mouth” Policy is Better
The only argument against China’s entry that has at least superficial plausibility is that
we can use denial of entry to keep the pressure on China to improve its human-rights
performance. If only this were true! But, frankly, this 800 lb. Gorilla is about as difficult to move
in these matters as the 1 oz. Gnat Cuba is! We have tried repeatedly with our annual MFN-
renewal debates in Congress to influence China’s behavior; but to no avail.
Besides, since we cannot possibly get any country of any trade or human-rights
importance to go along with us on using denial of trade access to China in our moral cause, the
net effect of using a trade-sanctions instrument to get at China is simply to divide our human-
rights community from our business community (which sees only a loss of markets to others as a
consequence of an unshared policy).
It is surely better then to shift from trade sanctions and instead use alternative instruments
which might be more effective since our own lobbies at least can unite behind them. Here, I
would opt for what I have called an “open-mouth” policy : a free and full-throated criticism at all
possible fora, such as the  Human Rights Commission in Geneva, to crowd the rulers of China .
They are no Hitler and  Stalin: and their loud distaste for such criticism shows that they are
vulnerable.
As China integrates into the world economy, and her prosperity grows, there will
certainly be an eventual, beneficial  effect on the Chinese  rulers’ policies on political and civil
rights. Meanwhile, our open-mouth policy will keep some pressure on them, reinforcing what
economics can contribute.
